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In The Portrait ofa Lady, after Isabel Archer rejects his proposal, Lord
Warburton begins his intellectual assault on her: he wants reasons. He
simply does not understand why she refuses him. Is it his house at
Lockleigh that she does not like? (Ifso, they can buy adifferent house.)
Perhaps she does not care for the climate there? (If that is the case, he
suggests, they can move to a different country.) Or is it to him or his
looks that she objects? He even goes as far as asking whether she
requires some recommendations about him. The comic effect does not
arise from Warburton's silly conception of love. In this context, given
the way in which love, for a woman, is associated with marriage,
and the way in which other characters do not understand Archer's
refusal, Warburton's notion of love is not bizarre. The comic effect
stems, rather, from the contrast between what he experiences in
himself-thinking about her all the time, looking at her every move-
and the fact that he expects that her love should proceed according to
some argumentative route. It is not her decision not to marry him that
he primarily wants to understand, but her not loving him. He sincerely
believes, this lord, that he can reason with her concerning whether or
not she should love him. He appeals to the normative. He seems to
want to argue her into loving him. And all this time it is the marvelous
length of her white neck as she bends her head, the density of her
braids, her charming back, and acertain flexibility in her movement of
which he is so painfully aware.
The contrast is between two conceptions of love: love as the con-
clusion of some argument as opposed to a momentary bewitchment of
one's gaze. But, more deeply, it is between two potential discourses on
love: one that thematically justifies, the other that captures and conveys.
Philosophy and literature? Not really. Both discourses form James'
(literary?) The Portrait ofa Lady.! Both make up this (philosophical?)
piece of writing through the simple device of allusion by paraphrase
and example.
It has become increasingly difficult to defend the old classifications
that have been used to explicate the differences between philosophy
and literature in terms of the discursive means that constitute their
language. It will no longer do to talk of a figurative, particular,
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evocative discourse as opposed to a literal. general and cognitive one.
The problem with these oppositions is not only that we have become
deeply suspicious regarding the ability clearly to distinguish between
emotions and cognition, or between the general and the particular. or
concerning the ability to construct a purely literal language. It is.
rather. the non-problematic way in which both literature and philosophy
can and do simply 'borrow' such elements from each other. Something.
no doubt. gets lost through such borrowing. which is why the word
should be cautiously used. However. whatever that something is. it is
not the poles of the oppositions which have been set up above.
Nevertheless. unless one chooses a non-discriminatory all-embracing
textuality, a difference between philosophy and literature has to be
acknowledged. If such di fference does not, however. lie in the elements
that make up these discourses. in what can such a difference reside?
Exploring this question is my general topic. For such purposes it seems
to me best to tum to a subject-matter regarding which the claim for
different capacities between phi losophical and literary discourses seems
to be most frequently raised: love.
Philosophers often talk of the inappropriateness of philosophy. the
sense of its simplicity in capturing love.2 Of course. the inadequacies
of philosophy need not indicate the cognitive status of its claims (that
philosophy's claims are inherently simplistic. or obvious) but. rather. a
sense of their deadness. That is. the supposed inappropriateness of
philosophical discourse regarding love does not stem from a short
degree of insight. but from the way in which it constitutes its reader's
low degree of responsiveness. However, while it may be tempting to
claim that literary texts create a more receptive reading. we may well
feel uneasy about opposing a trusting. yielding literary reading. and
a supposedly very rigid. unloving. critical, sense of self that a philo-
sophical work asks its reader to maintain.3 Experienced readers
of literature usually remain critical throughout the reading: sorting
out elements. evaluating. comparing. 'stepping back' and reflecting.
asking for love. or all of these. However. intellectualisation oflove can
also stem from sources not cognitive. It may well be the case that
reflecting on love. unlike other forms of intellectual activity. does not
arise only from a desire to know what it is. but rather from a need to
perceive it. A theorist of love is perhaps more like the heroine of
Delene Matthee's The Day the Swallows Spoke: someone who seems
to be solely instrumental about diamonds. asking various questions
concerning them (how they are classified. what the criterion ofverifying
them is. how to evaluate them comparatively and so on-but all along
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it is the touching and playing with the diamonds that capture her eyes.
The intellectual curiosity her questions imply is exposed as being an
assumed posture. one that is the outcome of deeper needs that have to
do less with intellectual classification and more with recognition. play,
and touch.
Ofcourse, talking of the needs that truly operate in certain forms of
inquiry is risky. Different readers may want different things at different
times. One is also usually motivated by more than one desire. It would
be best. therefore. to avoid any generalisations regarding what readers
'really' want and what is only secondary to them. Having said this, I
still wish to keep the idea that in some fields of intellectualisation-
love being one example-we want the object to be perceived through
the theory. Some objects compel us to rephrase them. The popularity of
love stories attests to the need both to produce and to consume such
reformulations. To lose sight of the hold these objects have, and the
way in which this fascination can be-or asks to be-translated into
theory would lead to insensitive theory.
I wish to implement these methodological remarks regarding what a
philosophy of love may involve in a reading of one aspect of Romeo
and Juliet, and to begin with the exploration of one sense of love using
a form of analysis that is as much a reformulation as it is a theory. On
a more general level, I wish to acknowledge and investigate further the
claim that literary works create greater responsiveness in their readers
than do philosophical texts. This would enable unpacking the claim
according to which the limitations of philosophy in treating love stem
from the sterile way in which philosophy connects its readers with its
insights. Such a sense ofdeadness, of deafness, would be explained by
my earlier claim that triviality is not necessarily banality situated
between aclaim and fact. but a state in which one is closed off to sense.
However, I also wish to elaborate ways through which such greater
responsiveness can be explained without invoking the problematic
routes surveyed above. Withdrawing from the cognitive and
metaphorical clusters that the notions ofidentification and trust invoke
would. in tum. require establishing other paths through which openness
to meaning can be explicated.
The problem
Let us begin by sensing something of the evasive complexity ofRomeo
and Juliet. The play does not seem complex. Indeed. it looks rather
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simple in the range of meanings to which it is tuned. If the Romantics
are to be believed, the tragedy is primarily an exquisite eulogy for
youth and first love, a love which is conceived as a totality ofemotional
investment, commitment and expression achieved through not knowing
the future, through being closed-as young lovers are-to the various
ways in which passion transforms into the blunt, persistent pain that
banality is.
However, reading the play in the way Hazlitt, Coleridge and
Schlegel have done is invalidated by elements of plot that seem to
be there precisely in order to block such one-sided appropriation.
Mercutio makes sharp ironic remarks concerning Romeo's infatuations
(' ... We'll draw thee from the mire I Of-save your reverence-love,
Wherein thou stickestl Up to the ears' [I.iv.41-43]).4 He also describes
Romeo as trivially sex-crazed rather than heavenly possessed by love
('For this drivelling love is like a great natural that runs lolling up and
down to hide his bauble in a hole' [lI.iv.91-93]). Such remarks are one
important way through which Shakespeare restricts a reading from
being tuned to and over-taken by passion alone. But the biggest
obstacle for such a reading is the peculiar fact that Romeo is introduced
already in love with another woman.
Presenting a hero with shallow emotions when a tragedy of love is
concerned seems blatantly wrong. This conclusion has been avoided
because of the tendency of commentary to dismiss Romeo's love to
Rosaline as false or solely sexual.5 Such an impression in fact endorses
the views of Mercutio and Friar Lawrence. Friar Lawrence never
did believe that Romeo loved Rosaline (lIJii.77-78) and Mercutio
considers the entire affair as a rather comical case of unful filled desire.
This, though, is hardly the way Romeo sees things. There is, no doubt,
emotional and linguistic development in Romeo. His love for Juliet is
much deeper than his feelings for Rosaline. However, doubting his
love for Rosaline is plainly contradicted by the reports of the depths of
his despair: 'Many a morning hath he there been seen, I With tears
augmenting the fresh morning's dew,l Adding to clouds more clouds
with his deep sighs; I But all so soon as the all-cheering sun I Should in
the farthest east begin to draw I The shady curtains from Aurora's bed,
I Away from light steals home my heavy son I And private in his
chamber pens himself, I Shuts up his windows, locks fair daylight out
I And makes himself an artificial night' (I.i.129-38). Claiming that
such a depressive state results solely from an unsatisfied sexual appetite
is unpersuasive.
So we hear that nothing can replace Rosaline in Romeo's heart
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('The all-seeing sun I Ne'er saw her match since first the world begun.'
[1.ii.94-95j), but then we are simply to accept the fact that all this is
gone as soon as he accidentally sees Juliet. Such an achievement has
been difficult even for very sympathetic readers.6 Can one really
believe that the love of someone who attests to having been 'stricken
blind' by Rosaline. to whom all other beauties are but 'a note' where he
reads the one who surpasses them all (1.i.230-34) can disappear,
change its object, merely because of a moment of sight? Does not such
characterisation posit an obstacle for any attempt to sympathise with
what Romeo later says to Juliet regarding the depths of his feelings for
her? Does not the whole tragic effect of the work suffer because of this
diminishing of Romeo?
The second chorus explains the change from Rosaline to Juliet in
the following way: 'Now old desire doth in his deathbed lie I And
young affection gapes to be his heir; / That fair for which love groan'd
for and would die, I With tender Juliet match'd, is now not faiL I Now
Romeo is belov'd and loves again. Alike bewitched by the charm of
looks,' (11.1-6). The first four lines describe the change; the last two
explain it through appealing to the mutuality that was missing from
Romeo's one-sided love for Rosaline.? The justification-altogether
missing from the first Quarto-is implausible. To begin with, Romeo
confesses to loving Juliet moments after seeing her (I. v.51), before he
could have possibly known or guessed about mutuality. However.
things are not only chronologically awkward but also substantively
implausible. If Romeo was indeed willing to die for Rosaline in that
day's afternoon. it is hardly a persuasive justification to appeal to the
fact that his falling in love with another woman in that day's evening is
the result of having some sense of being loved back.
Moreover, two additions of Shakespeare's to his source (Drooke's The
Tragicllll Historye ofRomeus lindJuliet) funher intensify the problem.
To begin with. Shakespeare compresses the time frame from several
months in Drooke to five days. including the turn from Rosaline to
Juliet. It is not so much that this makes the change from Rosaline to
Juliet implausibly faster in Shakespeare than in Drooke. In both, the
switch itself is fast. Dut the grave costs Romeo immediately has to
pay for his love when only days or hours ago he loved another. along
with his never questioning commitment. make him a potentially
unpersuasive. mechanical hero. Secondly. Friar Lawrence mocks him
at length for his changed disposition (Il.iii.61-80). Such mockery is
nowhere to be found in Drooke's description of the same scene. The
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fact that it is mockery and ridicule and not merely a questioning of his
state is also significant. Shakespeare's text thereby appears to invite a
reading according to which there is something altogether ludicrous in
Romeo's love. Opening up such a possibility seems inexplicable if we
assume that a tragic effect is ultimately intended.
Some replies
Some of those who have not simply dismissed Romeo's love for
Rosaline have suggested why appropriating the Rosaline affair from
Brooke's novella is justified. One may follow Hazlin and claim that
Shakespeare is portraying the way in which some of the more
overwhelming loves are not those where one turns from absence of
feeling to passion, but from a weaker to a stronger love.s A different
explanation is that by stressing a too easy shift between one loved
woman and another, Shakespeare highlights the way in which romantic
love is always, to some extent, implausible. Falling in love involves a
gap between psychological and circumstantial reasons and outcome, a
gap which is bridged by some leap. A third possihility, and one that
satisfied Coleridge, is that, through stressing Romeo's non-problematic
shift from Rosaline to Juliet, the love object is presented as a somewhat
contingent 'catch' ofa psychic state that already 'hunts'.9 We may add
to Coleridge's suggestion that Shakespeare would thereby achieve a
trivialising of the ohject of romantic love. One paradox of love that is
articulated by the play is, accordingly, the somewhat arbitrary nature
of the object as far as underlying needs go. and, on the other hand, a
privileging and disproportionate idealisation of it in its sped fics by the
lover. Such radical mystification of the non-unique is not merely a
discrepancy between underlying mechanics and the lover's awareness,
but is, in this play, a guiding principle of what a loving gaze is. Exalting
the ordinary is manifested in such places as the balcony scene in which
Romeo, enchanted, whispers 'She speaks' or 'See how she leans her
check upon her hanc' (IIJi.25, 23). The loving gaze is a new perceptivity
of the hitherto unnoticed. not because it has been hidden, but because
it was always there. You always saw it until you really did.
However, we mayclect to avoid adding missing justifications when
Shakespeare employs an implausible one (or. according to Ql, docs
not supply one at all). The unsaid and inexplicable in a literary work is
not necessarily there to be 'solved' through adding speculation-
filling out, as it were, the missing parts-but, rather, sometimes needs
to be explained as SUCh. An interpretive procedure that wants to respect
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the possibility that Shakespeare embeds gaps in plot, motivation and
characterisation in his plays should seek to explain how these points of
breakdown in flow of information cohere with the more general
structures of meaning that these works establish. In what follows I
shall claim that respecting this muteness reveals the philosophical
considerations that underlie this play.
Suspending doubt
In sharpening Romeo's instability and in making him face the
implausible ways in which he so easily replaces the ohject of his
infatuations, Shakespeare presents acontext in which scepticism towards
one's own cenainties should have been invoked. Shakespeare makes it
increasingly difficult for Romeo to hlind himself to the way in which
his emotional instability in the past threatens the veracity of his
feelings in the present. The fact that loving Juliet involves costs as
grave as dismembering himself from his family, foregoing his name,
and even losing his life, should have made him more perceptive to the
demand Friar Lawrence makes of him to examine his inner state. The
nurse also asks him about the seriousness of his feelings for Juliet
(ll.iv.158-68). Even Juliet's words should have made him question the
depths ofhis emotions: '0 swear not by the moon, th'inconstant moon,
/ That monthly changes in her circled orb, / Lest that thy love prove
likewise variable.' (lI.ii.l09-II). In the morning of this same day,
he was willing to die for Rosaline. Yet, in the face of all that Friar
Lawrence, Mercutio and Juliet tell him, Romeo refuses to engage in
self-exami nation.
A striking example of this refusal is the way Romeo answers the
Friar's mockeries: 'I pray thee chide me not, her I love now / Doth grace
for grace and love for love allow, / The other did not so.' (lLiii.81-83).
This answer in fact repeats the argument of the chorus, appealing to
the mutual nature of his and Juliet's love as opposed to his feelings for
Rosaline. The reply is panicularly interesting in the context of self-
examination since it is plainly inadequate. It says nothing about the
stability of his own emotions, which is what the Friar was questioning.
After all, Romeo could prove fickle-hearted in amutual love story.1llis
possihility should alarm Romeo in the face of all he has to give up.
But he does not hear this. What he attempts, instead, is to have the Friar
believe that this love has some better prospect ofworking out. The Friar
is questioning him ahout himself and his knowledge of himself but all
Romeo waDIs is the Friar's blessings.
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Connected with this refusal to look within is Romeo's unreflective
nature throughout the play. Indeed, it would be difficult to miss the
mechanical, trigger-response way in which he moves to action. He
fights, falls in love. and decides to kill himself. all without hesitation
or meditation. In this he manifests not only a deferral of reason (Friar
Lawrence calls him both mad and drunk [III.iii.61. 83D, but also what
appears to be a shallowness of emotion. However, the way Romeo is
characterised, the intensity and originalityofhis language, his cleverness
-manifested most clearly when he outwits sharp Mercutio--as well
as the simple fact that both expert and lay readers for centuries now
have related deeply to him and his love for Juliet instead ofcondemning
his superficiality and remaining unmoved by this supposed mechanical
nature, all make it impossible to dismiss him as shallow. Something is,
therefore, fundamentally missing from an account that stresses only
his unreflective aspect.
A clue to this question may be found in the fact that Romeo is not
only unreflective in his practice, but makes an explicit attack on
philosophy and its value:
Friar L. Thou fond mad man, hear me a little speak.
Romeo. 0, thou wilt speak again of banishment.
Friar L. I' \I give thee annour to keep off that word,
Adversity's sweet milk, philosophy,
To comfort thee though thou art banished.
Romeo. Yet 'banished'? Hang up Philosophy.
Unless Philosophy can make a Juliet.
Displant a town, reverse a Prince's doom,
It helps not, it prevails not. TaJk no more.
Friar L. 0, then I see that mad men have no ears.
Romeo. How should they when that wise men have no eyes?
Friar L. Let me dispute with thee of thy estate.
Romeo. Thou canst not speak of that thou dost not feel.
Wert thou as young as I, Juliet thy love,
An hour but married, TybaJt murdered,
Doting like me, and like me banished,
Then mightst thou speak. then mightst thou tear thy hair
And faJl upon the ground as I do now,
Taking the measure of an unmade grave.
(III.iii.52-70)
Phi losophy is useless and blind. To the extent that he can be understood,
Romeo requires not some abstract advice, a 'dispute' as to his 'estate',
but someone who feels what he does. This dismissal of philosophy
coheres with the way in which reflective wisdom (Friar Lawrence) is
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portrayed in this playas cold, non-penetrating, and, ultimately, the
origin of all disaster. It is also in line with the way the supposed
wisdom of the elderly (heralded in Brooke's introductory note to his
readers as what the young couple rebelled against, condemning
themselves through that very rebellion) leads to catastrophe through its
insensitivity. But Romeo is not simply unphilosophical. After his
display of wit, Mercutio praises Romeo for his regained 'art' which is
also a regaining of his old self ('Now art thou sociable, now art thou
Romeo; now art thou what thou an, by art as well as by nature'
[ll.iv.89-91 D. Such a remark conveys to us that Romeo is not in his
'usual' state during the events we witness.
All this boils down to saying that the play does not present ashallow
hero, but rather a movement of withdrawing from wisdom. Love
involves playing down cenain possibilities of thought, a silencing of
both internal and external sceptical voices. to Such selective awareness
is not merely acondition for loving, but an aspect of how romantic love
operates, ofwhat it is. Love is not astate in which questions concerning
what one truly feels cannot be raised. It is also not a state in which one
refuses to ask them. More than these, (and as anyone who has ever tried
to talk someone out of loving knows) it is a condition in which one
refuses seriously to consider that such questions are there at all. In
meeting such refusal in a lover, we do not perceive stubbornness
caused hy love, but rather see an aspect oflove itself. In some domains,
allowing cenain questions to be raised is a letting go of something one
has. 11
We should note the suhlle contrasts Shakespeare draws here between
Romeo and Juliet. Unlike Romeo, Juliet does allow sceptical voiccs to
speak. She not only doubts Romeo's affections, employing aconditional
mode of discourse regarding love: 'Dost thou love me? I know thou
wilt say' ay' ,I And I will take thy word. Yet, if thou swear' st,l Thou
mayst provc falsc' (II.iL90-92); and: 'If that thy bcnt of love be
honourable' (lI.iLI43). Howevcr, what is evident in Juliet is that for
her, suspending scepticism is not like Romeo's partial awareness, but
a choice. In opposition to Romeo, Juliet seems to he always aware of
the possihility of douht, but she opts for a willing hlindness. She
decides to believe him (lULl IS).
Romeo's automatic move from stimuli to action is nowhere more
blatant than in the momcnts when he rcccives news ofJuliet's supposed
death:
Romco. Is it e'en so? Thcn I defy you, Sl<lrs!
Thou know'Sl my lodging. Get me ink and paper,
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And hire posthorses. I will hence tonight
Bal. I do beseech you sir, have patience.
Your looks are pale and wild and do import
Some misadventure.
Romeo. Tush thou art deceiv'd.
Leave me, and do the thing I bid thee do.
Hast thou no letters to me from the Friar?
Bal. No, my good lord.
Romeo. No matter. Get thee gone.
And hire those horses. I'll be with thee straight
Exit Balthasar
Well, Juliet, I will lie with thee tonight
Let's see for means ...
(V.I.24-35)
Without lingering for a single moment on his loss, he moves to plan
means for his suicide. Compare this to the endless verbalisations in
Capulet's house but one scene earlier when Juliet's supposedly dead
body is discovered. Lady Capulet immediately says she will kill
herself, though this, unlike Romeo's practical seriousness, is empty
talk. Capulet himself initially says that death has tied up his tongue and
will not let him speak (IV. v.31-32). But then he talks (34-40), and he
talks (59-64) and then he talks some more (84-90); and all along it is
about himself and what he has lost. The nurse in her exceedingly
repetitive lament expresses the deepest feelings: '0 weraday that ever
I was born.' (lV.v.15), '0 lamentable day!' (17), 'Look, look! 0 heavy
day!' (19), ' ... Alack the day!' (23), '0 lamentable day!' (30), which
culminates in nothing shorter than a six-line repetition of almost these
same lines (49-54).
The less articulate the language used, the deeper the extent of
sorrow. This makes Romeo's unexpressed grief almost shout its
existence at us through its silence. His mechanical move to behaviour
is linked to his pale, mad looks. An unreflecting turning to action
manifests here not a hollow heart, but depths of grief and shock.
Romeo is a man who seems to be able to talk about his emotions
forever. However, here he simply cannot look within. We meet again
the dismissal of thought and a preference for action. However, in
contrast to earlier moments in which this refusal manifested itself
Romeo is now not only sealed off from wisdom but also from expression.
Instead, he is suddenly aware of the unbearable passing of time.
Balthasar, his man, asks him to 'have patience' (V.i.27), to change,that
is, his relation to the movement of time. However, all Romeo thinks
about is carrying out his plans as soon as possible. 12
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Suspending reality
The infatuation of romantic love involves avoiding scepticism either
through the operations of acensuring mechanism that love acti vates or
through whatever it is that makes one choose cenainty. What I wish to
tum to now is exploring the ways Shakespeare ponrays such withdrawals
from reflection. More specifically, the way Romeo's love involves not
only circumventing the possibility ofdoubt, but asuspension ofreality.
We may begin here with Romeo's disorientation: the way in which
he does not know that it is morning in the very first line he utters
(1.i.l57) or the way that he only vaguely pays attention to significant
things others say: 'What said my man when my betossed soul/Did not
attend him as we rode? I think / He told me Paris should have married
Juliet' (VJii.76-78). But Romeo is not merely confused. He is, rather,
presented as being in adream-like state. For Romeo, wakefulness and
dream flow one into the other: ' ... I am afeard, / Being in night, all this
is but a dream,' (IIJi.l39-40), 'Said he not so? Or did I dream it so?'
(V.iii.79). The entire love affair between Romeo and Juliet is structured
somewhat like adream: it takes place only in nights, it does not respect
social and familial affiliations, wishing it could be altogether conducted
without names. It disregards reality (Juliet's refusal to accept the
coming of dawn); it creates its own sense of time. The either-or of
oneirics and actuality is replaced with a fuzzy logic in which the
distinction is destahilised.
Most of these observations as to the state of the lovers are not
new. 13 What has not been appreciated enough is, Ithink, the connection
between creating the ontological vagueness connected with love-
enabling romantic love and being enabled by it-and acenain rhetoric
the lovers exploit. Suspending awell-defined reality involves deploying
a language of approximations, used extensively in the rhetoric of love.
Such approximations range over several domains: an inability to
express one's impressions with exactness-'Is love atender thing? It is
too rough, / Too rude, too boisterous' (I.iv.25-26), ' ... this is but a
dream, / too flattering sweet to be substantial.' (Il.ii.l40-41); or to
be exact about the loved one's anributes-'She is too fair, too wise'
(1.i.219), 'Beauty too rich for use, for earth too dear.' (I. v.46); or in the
relative 'correctness' of the love in its relation to social norms-'I have
no joy of this contract tonight: / It is too rash, too unadvis'd, too
sudden,' (Il.ii. I 17-18). In all of these, the description is not through
employing some positive term, but through using arelational predicate
that will not do because of some disproportion: there is a roughness
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that one can bear but not the roughness of love. There is a beauty that
can be used, though not Juliet's.
This is not all. A 'reality instinct' involves relating to things as
clearly bounded, quantifiable entities. Bracketing off reality in the
hazy domain of love, therefore, also takes the rhetorical form of an
inability to count which Juliet repeats: 'But my true love is grown to
such excess / I cannot sum up sum of half my wealth.' (II.vi.33-34),
'My bounty is as boundless as the sea, / My love as deep: the more I
give to thee / The more I have, for both are infinite.' (l1.ii.132-35),
'Romeo is banished, / There is no end, no limit, measure, bound, / In
that word's death.' (1II.ii.124-26). At its extreme, the opposition
between love and actuality is manifested in Romeo's love rhetoric as
challenging reality: he defies the stars and would swim to the shore of
the farthest sea. Hyperbole becomes a most ample trope through which
hostility to factuality can be fonnulated. TIle use ofhyperbole contributes
to dissociating the discursive world that the lovers develop from the
banal restrictions of actuality. Such disconnection is aided by the
extensive use of another figure: oxymoron, a device that many have
noted to be the most dominant rhetorical tool employed in this play.14
Oxymoron, the figure that underlies Romeo's opening lines, creates
a sense of dream-logic that eschews 'correct' reasoning patterns.
Hyperbole, too, contributes to the dreamy quality of the affair since, in
the way in which it corresponds to the exaggeration ofwishes, hyperbole
is itself a structural feature ofdreams. 15 Both hyperbole and oxymoron
embody a stepping out of reasonable proportions and reasonable
thinking, a forsaking of actuality. 16
However, love in the play is not only a forsaking of the world, some
dim, foggy experience, but also a penetration of it through heightened
perception. Abandoning the conventional categories which structure
perception involves substituting new, hitherto unseen (and possibly
unimagined) connections for them. The imaginative discourse of love
establishes such links: seeing Romeo at night as a flake of new snow
carried on a raven's back, envisaging Juliet as a teacher of a class of
torches, explaining to them by her own example how they can shine
brighter, wanting to be a woman's glove, wishing to be her sleep.
Sleep
Love and dreaming both involve a sense ofdisproportion, a dismissing
of what is normatively and physically correct, a sense of fuzziness, a
change in perception that involves both new seeing and new blindness.
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The overlap between these domains in this play begins when we
recognise that in the vision ofromantic love Romeo exemplifies, being
in a dream-like state is not merely similar to love, but a condition for
the suspension of scepticism that makes love possible. However. this
kind of conceptualisation does not go as far as it should because it still
distinguishes between love as some clearly defined passion and its
enabling condition. However, the sort oflove this work exhibits makes
no such distinction: Romeo is afraid that being in night, 'all this' is but
a dream. His is not the story of a passion being enahled by something
else, but this ex~rience, this inability to leave her, has a dream-like
quality. An oneiric quality of experience is simply a part of what
romantic love is.
So self-doubt in Romeo never reaches the surface and this is a part
of the total change of his experience. Dut what about the reader? We
could not have heen affected by this tragedy so much had we kept
questioning the constancy of Romeo' s feci ings. Through Rosali ne, the
play presents a context in which such doubts should have been
unavoidable not only for Romeo, but also for us. Yet, the play's greater
achievement is that we seem to be blind or dismissive towards them.
Hazlitt. who loved this play so much, told us how to dismiss doubts
about the sort of Jove the play presents, regarding such douhts as
stemming from 'grey hair' conceptions of love. Willie van Peer. a
recent critic, says much the same thing when he claims that those who
dismiss the play act from 'repressed emotionality. or acynical disbelief
in any utopian vision of the relationship between men and women' .t7
However. these are merely examples in a tradition that misses the
entire dimension of deferred doubts set in motion hy the Rosaline
affair. My own impression is that 'Jay' as well as 'professional' readers
who have not examined the work in detail need to be reminded of the
existence of Rosaline in the first place. This disregard. I helieve, is as
telling as significant forgetting ever gets.
So how do we come to be as forgetful and dismissive of Rosaline as
Romeo is? One way to answer this is to claim that. like Romeo. we too
dream through the play. One can get support for this route through
pointing to impressions of readers like Norman Holland and Drian
Gibbons who have indeed spoken of a dream-like quality of the
affair. t8 For me, however. Kafka's works are more persuasive
contenders for such reading experience. A second option involves
exposing the psychological pull of the play. Norman Holland has
suggested that the whole play is nothing 'hut the most exquisite
expression of the child's inverted wish for love: "wait till I'm gone.
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then they'll be sorry.''' 19 Such an explanation fits in nicely with the
possibility that some of us go through a dream-like response to this
play. Ifdreams are sometimes, or, pace Mercutio's Queen Mab speech,
always wish-fulfilments (I.iv.71-88), Holland supplies us with a
substantial guess as to the wish projected on to this fictional domain by
actual readers. However, the problem with Holland's idea is that
assuming a work plays on a certain wish or drive in the reader is never
enough. A different work, say, Brooke's The Tragica/l Historye of
Romeus and Juliet. could be an expression of an identical wish or need,
yet would fail in capturing its reader. This is, incidentally, why any
explanation that seeks to account for 'pull' solely through projected
psychological mechanisms would not suffice. Even if we agree that
such a projection is one response panern this work invites, it remains to
be asked how Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet in particular succeeds
in eliciting such projection from us.
If we choose to avoid Holland's suggestion, it seems to me we are
left with no real alternative, which some find to be an anachronistic,
suspicious and ideologically laden concept but which I find unavoidable
in discussing some works of literature: the aesthetic. Not seeing that
scepticism should have arisen in Romeo intimates to us a pattern of
response that copies his own blindness regarding the stability of his
emotions. For him such blindness is achieved through divorce from
reality and Juliet's beauty. The blindness ofenthusiastic readers seems
to be an effect of the strong reformulation of love that the play
articulates. In the fictional domain, dream-like experience involves
perceiving the beauty ofa person. On the level ofresponse, forgetfulness
results from moments in which one is overtaken by the beauty of
fictions. 20
Philosophy and Literature
But what is beauty? Shakespeare was not a philosopher. It is therefore
inappropriate to see him as presenting some theory of beauty. However,
it is also implausible to relate to his text as if it does not convey to us
some understanding of what certain experiences of beauty are. It is
when we anempt to extract such understanding that we may perceive
the more far-reaching reflective relation that Romeo and Juliet creates.
We can begin by noting the similarities between what a loving gaze is
according to this play and sensing beauty in art. Both may involve
dissecting into parts which are then perceived dismembered from the
whole, a need to measure what one looks at and thenjudging it as either
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surpassing all others or beyond compare (a judgemcnt that most
obviously corresponds with conceptualisations of the suhlime). a sense
of holiness, of the object as shining through. the wish to keep on
looking. a suspending of doubt. of ontology, losing a sense of time.
Of course. if Shakespeare was a philosopher on his way to present
a theory in aesthetics, he should have begun hy some qualifications as
to the possihle differences between heauty ofpersons and heauty in art.
He should have then pointed out that the observations ahove relate
more to what experiencing heauty may involve than to really explaining
what 'it' is. They form description not analysis.21 However. Romeo
and Juliet is not a philosophical theory.
Dut, if that is the case, is it not plainly wrong to try to relate to this
playas anything but a work of art? Should not a philosopher who
desires to understand. say. love do better in getting involved with
philosophical theories regarding the concept rather than seeking some
understanding from works that wcrc never intended to be knowledge-
yielding? Moreovcr, what, for that matter. is the status ofthis discourse?
Ifall the play was supposed to yield for the purpose of this philosophical
discourse was a description of the expericnce of heauty. why did we
hother reading the play in the first place? We could have much more
conveniently lifted such remarks out of the context of the work and
assessed them as part of a theory of heauty.
Answering these qucstions hegins with raising an old distinction
between a discourse that presents and one that conveys; between a
mode of expression that infonns and one that re-presents; between a
language in which justification takes the form ofproposal and argument
and one that harks back to thc rcader's own sense of life through
rekindling personal experiences and therein finding the ultimate
justification for what it says. Lifting the remarks above regarding the
experience of beauty out of the context of Shakespearc's text would
have yielded description. So one advantage in invoking literature lies
in the way in which it can convcy and not descrihe ccrtain claims
about love and personal heauty. However, more needs to be said about
what 'conveying' should mean in this context. Works of literature are
structures ofexperience. Interpreting a text is a suggcsted way through
which to accomplish such structuring or restructuring. Appealing
to literature. therefore. enahles cstahlishing claims. hut not through
presenting and arguing for them. Instead, we are presented with an
experiential possihility~ a state through which we are supposed to
experience the way certain claims express a human truth.
Shakespearc's work. I argued. docs not mcrely remind orconvcy to
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us our blindness in love. but. on the dimension of aesthetic response.
blinds us to an implausible aspect of this love story. The play presents
a vision of personal beauty that involves a suspension of doubt. The
same relation to beauty structures the reception of the playas well.
This time blindness is an aspect of an enthusiastic experience ofart. So
on a more abstract level we can-keeping possible disanalogies in
mind-relate what the play tells us about the experience of personal
beauty to what we may wish to know about the experience of beauty in
art. What we get to experience here. what is conveyed and not simply
claimed or reported is. therefore. the way blindness and aesthetic
response can converge. 22
Moving from description to conveying does not circumvent the
charge above that such remarks do not constitute analysis. They
constitute. rather. a telling reformulation of an effect, of beauty as an
effect.23 However, pressing the analogy between beauty of person and
beauty of art as far as this work allows enables transcending description
and achieving partial analysis. We have already noted the way the
Rosaline affair enables Shakespeare to present the love for Juliet as
conditioned upon a pre-existing hunger in Romeo. This model opposes
the more simplistic conceptualisation involved in the idea of a Cupid
that shoots his arrows arbitrarily. The contrast is simple yet not trivial.
It is between a model according to which love is simply a relationship
between a lover and a beloved and a model that begins explaining how
one falls in love before encounter with the lover takes place. The idea
ofa framework ofconditions that enable love also exists on the level of
aesthetic appreciation. Arguing for such conditions in the latter sense
involves. I think, distinguishing between two claims. both of which I
wish to assert. The first is the rather banal diachronic claim according
to which appreciating the aesthetic quality of a work of art involves a
readiness. Works of art do not speak to us on all occasions. The second
is the more interesting synchronic claim according to which perceiving
beauty in art enables and is made possible by a restructuring of
experience that changes perception. cognition and emotion. Unlike
sticks and stones. both beauty of person and beauty in art cannot
simply be fully recognised. Rather. such complete perception involves
subtle reworkings. as well as-since non-perceptiveness is at stake-
unworkings of the very framework through which one perceives. Like
the relations between love and dreaming. those between beauty and
suspending doubt are not causal but ofcontainment. Suspending doubt
is not an effect of some dazzling beauty of art but rather a part of what
some moments of aesthetic pleasure involve. In Romeo and Juliet
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moreover, such blindness is not only momentary, but a part of an
overall reaction to the work.
Finally, we are able to ask what knowledge this discouse presumes
to produce. knowledge which could not have been derived from a
philosophical discourse that did not appeal to literature. The question
arises since the description/conveying distinction boiled down to
differences in the ways in which beliefs are estahlished and not to
differences in the knowledge-claims themselves. The fact that acertain
vision of love is conveyed in a stronger way through literature rather
than philosophy says nothing about the truth of the vision itself. False
visions can be conveyed through the liveliest of means. It is here that
much work into the philosophy/literature relations makes the mistake
of not distinguishing clearly between asking for types of knowledge
that reading literature can produce and asking for the unique gain
in such a procedure-asking, that is. what knowledge. if any. such
reading can produce that 'philosophy' taken on its own cannot.
Philosophical readings of literary texts supply us with beliefs. In
my own reading. these beliefs regard concepts like love and beauty. If
both the literary work and its proposed interpretation are persuasive.
such beliefs can turn into experiential knowing. lllis means that. on
one level. what reading or seeing a play achieves for philosophy is not
a difference in the belief that is supposed to be known. but in the way
through which the helief is justified. We do not get to entertain a belief
about love or beauty that could not have been raised by a philosophy
that does not invoke literature. but to entertain some beliefs in a
different way. We achieve a different kind of knowing. To be sure.
knowing through experience is not necessarily better than knowing
through argument. It may well be that one should modify. for various
reasons and arguments, the way one experiences certain states. However,
things can also he the other way round-a heliefsupported by argument
should be modified since it strongly opposes one's sense of life. What
can he asserted with confidence regarding the relevance of literature to
philosophy is. I think. that to dismiss experiential knowing from the
domains of philosophy is to give up a mode of knowing which is at the
very least as important as knowledge hy argument. It is to opt for a
philosophy that is both limiting and limited. When philosophy attempts
to address itself to 'life', such limitation could well result in a false
philosophy.
Saying that literature can make us entertain certain beliefs in a
different way explains why literature is relevant for philosophy. But
this is not all. On a second level literature does supply us with new,
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philosophically relevant beliefs. These beliefs relate to the concept of
knowledge itself. Reading literature enables us to distinguish between
different ways in which we can be made to listen. Philosophers reading
literature get to explore contexts ofdiscovery. Mega-epistemic notions
such as 'reader-experience' or 'conveying' are unpacked into patterns
of relating to sense that emerge in specific contexts. Regarding the
concept of knowledge, a persuasive philosophical reading of a literary
text yields justified beliefs and not mere beliefs since, when convincing,
it proves that the patterns ofcognitive experience it talks about do exist
simply through giving examples of them. My own reading sought to
show that there exists an experience of personal and aesthetic beauty
that involves a certain hlindness. I tried to support this claim in
showing how it has been repeatedly actualised in specific, real, reading
experiences of Romeo and Juliet that involved an imponant dismissal.
We began with the question ofphilosophy's repeated self-acknowledged
triteness and simplicity in treating love, with the question of its
supposed inadequacies and muteness. Through reading Romeo and
Juliet, a paradigmatic literary portrayal of romantic love, we have one
answer. Non-aesthetic discourse may be able to explain how love
operates or what it is. However. it fails to enact the epistemic conditions
that enable perceiving love. Such perception is required in a theoretical
activity on love since what some ofus need from such intellectualisation
is not only explanation but, I suggested. also reformulation. This is
how we get to feel untouched by non-aesthetic discourse on love.
Triviality, I claimed, is not necessarily banality. It could also involve a
claim that does not really speak to one. What is unique to literary
discourse is not primarily that it is particular, evocative, figurative, or
simply denser in such elements than other discourse. Rather, literature
reshapes our listening capacities in cenain ways. Through the rhetorical
strategies that are enacted by this play both in the fictional domain and
in the dimension of response, we are made ready to perceive.
Examining Romeo and Juliet and the way in which some of us
react to it imparts not only a conception of romantic love, but also
informs us as to the way through which we may recognise beauty. It
tells us something about how we perceive and about how we can be
made to listen. It would simply not do to oppose a critical, suspicious
philosophical experience of reading to a trusting, yielding literary one.
To the extent that we can talk of trust, we may say that, in those rare
moments in which we are captured by some line, we also suspend
reality. doubt, and reflection. All of these may return almost at once.
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reality, doubt, and reflection. All of these may return almost at once.
But for a few moments, we get to be blinded to doubt. Which is, at least
partly. what aesthetic experience can involve.
Philosophical readings of literary works are parts of 'descriptive
epistemology', or 'rhetoric' or whatever title it is that captures an
investigation that seeks to achieve a detailed comprehension of human
responsiveness-an investigation that may ultimately explain why
philosophy cannot make a Juliet. 24
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However. such a vision requires discussing a different work.
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